

SUGGESTIONS

FOR THE PROPER DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES

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AN ECONOMICAL AND
VASTLY EFFICIENT ARMY



It is said that officers are the greatest need
in Modern Warfare. A Force of
3,000,000 could be officered from
the Army outlined herein.



AN ARMY STATIONED AS
SUGGESTED WOULD INSURE
DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PROPER DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES.

The regular army of the United States has an authorized strength of 84,000 men and 4,746 officers, a total of 88,746 or one regular soldier for each 1,100 of our population. The desertions each year are 5.62 per cent of the total, or about one out of every 16 enlisted, that being the average for the last eleven years.

The General Staff of the Army and General Leonard Wood have recently issued through the War Department an interesting pamphlet, "Facts of interest concerning the military resources and policy of the United States". One of the most important statements in this little brochure is that "The time required for the training of extemporized armies depends largely on the presence of trained instructors". Another important statement says: "In brief, short service and few re-enlistments, except non-commissioned officers and a few skilled privates, with its concentrated progressive instruction and resulting passing through the army and return to civil and industrial pursuits of as many men as possible, means preparedness for war at a minimum expense and by means in accordance with our ideas". The point of this is that the training as soldiers of a large number by frequent changes of the personnel and that those who had served their term of enlistment would form a reserve. This theory, it is pointed out, is based upon the experience of Switzerland, but it is very doubtful if it would work out in practice in this country. The people of Switzerland are homogeneous and the men are easily located after they leave the colors, as they are not much given to migrating, whereas the men who now enlist in the United States Army are generally of a roving disposition, not easily got at after they leave the service.

Very many plans have been formulated and submitted for making most effective our small regular army as a nucleus for a larger army in case of necessity. Events on the other side of the water, particularly the unpreparedness of England for the present war, should be a lesson to us. In their great crisis, while the total number of enlistments has been fairly satisfactory, they have been lamentably deficient in competent instructors and officers, and the records show that in modern warfare officers are killed off like flies.

The ideal plan for the United States would be an increase of the army to a total strength of 200,000, or one soldier for each 500 inhabitants, and then to make the profession of soldiering in the United States as attractive for the enlisted man as it is today for the officer; so attractive that there would be no desertions and the army man for man very much the best army in the world. We have plenty of the right material and what I suggest could readily be done by offering inducements to attract and hold the right kind of men.

Make the pay of a private \$20 a month, the pay of a corporal \$25 a month, the pay of a sergeant \$30 a month, and add \$1 a month for each year of service. With this system fully established, the greatest punishment that could be inflicted would be dismissal from the service.

I admit that it would cost something, but what is that to insuring perfect security against any domestic outbreak or against any possible foreign invasion.

With such an army we would be secure against any such invasion as outlined in General Bernhardt's book, or such an invasion as is so graphically pictured in recent numbers of the Sunday Sun, because

100,000 of this army, with the 125,000 National Guardsmen and such auxiliaries as could hastily be obtained, would hold in check any possible invading force, while the remaining 100,000 would be actively at work getting in shape by intensive training the 1,000,000 men that could readily be enlisted in 48 hours.

Bearing in mind that the 200,000 original selected men would be mentally and physically sound and trained to the minute in everything connected with the business of a soldier, if the emergency should arise, each man of the 100,000 could take charge of ten men, teach them how to shoot, how to take care of themselves in the field, how to take cover, to construct entrenchments, etc.

Under such competent instructors, two months would suffice to fit for the field the greater part of the entire number, officered so far as the companies and regiments were concerned by their preceptors, all of whom would have sufficient intelligence and ability to command a company, and many of them would be fully competent to command a regiment.

To make this plan most effective, the United States Government should select and designate suitable rallying points in the neighborhood of such places as San Francisco, Portland, Oregon, Omaha, San Antonio, Chicago, Atlanta, Louisville, New York, Boston and Raleigh. At each of these places, in case of necessity, 100,000 recruits would be mustered, instructed and maneuvered. In peace times a division of 10,000 men could be kept at each of these places affording an opportunity for the officers of high rank to acquire practical experience in handling bodies of troops larger than a regiment, as these troops could be arranged in skeleton organizations to represent brigades, divisions and corps.

All the information we get about the present war goes to show that the artillery is much the most effective arm in modern warfare, and this fact is the strongest argument in favor of the scheme I have outlined, as everybody at all conversant with the matter knows that it takes time to train an artilleryman and that is especially true in these days of complicated mechanism and scientific warfare. Hence the desirability, I might say the absolute necessity, of continuing in the service as long as possible all men who by reason of experience have become experts with modern weapons of warfare.

Congress should authorize and the Government should take steps to organize as an auxiliary to the forces outlined the field forces of the telegraph and telephone companies. These men would be invaluable in modern warfare. Many of the foremen are adepts in the use of high explosives and the men could be used in the necessary work of warfare such as trench digging, building bridges and roads, laying pontoons, erecting impenetrable obstacles of barbed wire and especially valuable in placing and connecting mines. Their proper organization is simply a matter of detail.

As a suggestion ten regiments might be organized, the headquarters of each of the regiments should be with one of the ten corps headquarters at or near the cities already specified as this would keep the expense down and simplify the mobilization in case of necessity.

As an inducement to enroll, the men should be paid a nominal sum, say \$2.00 a month, with full pay for the time spent in camp which might be limited to four weeks each year.

Modern warfare demands large numbers of experienced aviators. This is a matter of such vital importance that the entire force (10,000) at one of the places selected for stationing troops should devote their whole time to war aeronautics. These men should be selected from the mass of the army and one of the ten corps headquarters designated as the permanent station where the climatic conditions would permit the work to go on throughout the year.

